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The Diminishing Dominion of Expert 
Opinion: 
Missouri’s Imposition of the Ultimate Issue 
Rule 
Michael S. Figenshau* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2017, the Missouri General Assembly amended its expert 
testimony statute, Section 490.065.1  The newly-enacted Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) states, “In a criminal case, an expert witness shall not state 
an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state 
or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a 
defense.  Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.”2  Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) (“Rule 
704(b)”).3  This change is significant because issues in criminal cases, such 
as deliberation with respect to homicide and the affirmative defense of 
insanity, frequently implicate defendants’ mental states.4  In addition, Rule 
704(b) and its state-law counterparts have drawn significant scholarly 
criticism as unduly restricting helpful expert testimony.  For example, one 
 
*B.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2021; Layout and Design Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2019–2020.  Thanks to Professor Ben Trachtenberg and the editors of Missouri Law 
Review for their guidance and feedback during the writing and editing processes.  
Thanks to the Hon. Philip M. Hess of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, 
for inspiring this topic. 
 1. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (2017). 
 2. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065.2(3)(b) (2017). 
 3. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
 4. See Michael A. Graham, §704(2) Opinion on an Ultimate Issue: Mental State 
or Condition, 6 HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 704(2) (8th ed.) (2019) (“Presumably the 
expert may answer the questions ‘Was the accused suffering from a mental disease or 
defect?,’ ‘Explain the characteristics of the mental disease and defect,’ ‘Was his act 
the product of that disease or defect?’ and ‘What is the effect of the disease or defect 
on the person’s mental state?’  However the expert may not answer the question ‘Was 
the accused able to appreciate the nature and quality of his act?’ or ‘Was the accused 
able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts?’”) (internal citations omitted). 
1
Figenshau: The Diminishing Dominion of Expert Opinion: Missouri’s Imposition
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
846 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
scholar argues Rule 704(b) produces “counterproductive” and “troubling” 
results by “requir[ing] the jury, as the finder of fact, to reach a conclusion 
as to the defendant’s mental state without the benefit of the most useful 
testimony the expert could offer.”5 
Consider the case of United States v. West, where the defendant, 
charged with bank robbery, asserted the affirmative defense of insanity.6  
The trial court appointed a psychiatrist who concluded West suffered from 
schizoaffective disorder, a severe mental disease.7  The psychiatrist also 
concluded that West appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions in 
robbing the bank – a finding that would be fatal to West’s insanity 
defense.8  Defense counsel invoked Rule 704(b) to argue that although the 
psychiatrist could testify that West suffered from schizoaffective disorder, 
the psychiatrist could not testify that West appreciated the wrongfulness 
of his conduct.9  Rule 704(b) allowed this result by drawing a distinction 
between the two statements: the former was an opinion on the ultimate 
issue of West’s mental state, but the latter was not.10  This distinction 
afforded defense counsel the “thrill of using the state-appointed expert to 
distort the factfinding process.”11  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit agreed with defense counsel, holding that Rule 704(b) 
would block the psychiatrist’s opinion that West could appreciate the 
difference between right and wrong, but would not operate to exclude the 
psychiatrist’s conclusion that West suffered from schizoaffective 
disorder.12  The court, however, was “clearly concerned that the expert’s 
testimony, bereft of its ultimate conclusion, would be 
misrepresentative.”13 
Although the federal reporters contain many cases with odd problems 
arising under Rule 704(b), Missouri reporters contain little law about 
Section 490.065.2(3)(b).  Since its promulgation, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals has addressed Section 490.065.2(3)(b) in three criminal cases but 
found it inapplicable in each case.14  Thus, although psychiatric testimony 
 
 5. See Daniel J. Capra, A Recipe for Confusion: Congress and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691, 691–95 (2001) (citing Dana R. Hassin, How 
Much is Too Much? Rule 704(b) Opinions on Personal Use vs. Intent to Distribute, 
55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 671 (2001)). 
 6. United States v. West, 962 F.3d 1243 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 7. Id. at 1245. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Capra, supra note 5. 
 12. West, 962 F.3d at 1248. 
 13. Id. at 1249. 
 14. State v. Capozzoli, 578 S.W.3d 841, 845–47 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); State v. 
Walther, 581 S.W.3d 702, 705 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Murphy, 534 S.W.3d 
408, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
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plays a pivotal role in criminal proceedings,15 no case has turned on the 
admission or exclusion of evidence pursuant to Section 490.065.2(3)(b).  
This Note serves as a prospective guide, based on both state and federal 
jurisprudence, to the application of Section 490.065.2(3)(b) in Missouri 
criminal cases that question the admissibility of psychiatric evidence 
pertaining to the defendant’s requisite mental culpability for the crime 
charged.   
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of Rule 704(b) and 
examines possible motivations for the Missouri General Assembly’s 
enactment of Section 490.065.2(3)(b).  Part III discusses the three 
Missouri Court of Appeals cases that mention Section 490.065.2(3)(b).  
Part III emphasizes that, although Section 490.065.2(3)(b) has not yet 
determined the outcome of a case, it is prudent to understand and interpret 
Section 490.065.2(3)(b) for when it is implicated in future cases.  Part IV 
suggests Missouri courts must inquire into both state and federal 
jurisprudence to properly determine the admissibility of psychiatric 
testimony in criminal trials.   
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part discusses relevant history before Missouri’s enactment of 
Section 490.065.2(3)(b) in 2017.  Subpart A examines Rule 704 in its 
original form, which abolished the “ultimate issue” rule,16 discussed infra, 
and Subpart B examines Congress’s addition of Rule 704(b), which 
revives the ultimate issue rule in criminal cases.17  Finally, Subpart C 
highlights State v. Clements, a 1990 case in which the Missouri Court of 
Appeals relied on Rule 704(b) in holding that exclusion of certain expert 
testimony on the defendant’s mental state deprived him of a fair trial.  This 
Part suggests that Clements marks the beginning of Missouri courts’ long-
standing alignment with federal jurisprudence with respect to expert 
testimony on a criminal defendant’s mental state. 
A. Rule 704 in its Original Form 
As originally proposed by the United States Supreme Court’s 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence (“the Advisory 
Committee”), and adopted without change by Congress, Rule 704 
provided that “testimony in the form of an opinion or inference is not 
objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided 
by the trier of fact.”18  Today, Rule 704(a), which resembles the original 
 
 15. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985). 
 16. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note. 
 17. Capra, supra note 5. 
 18. Capra, supra note 5. 
3
Figenshau: The Diminishing Dominion of Expert Opinion: Missouri’s Imposition
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
848 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
text of Rule 704, states that “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because 
it embraces an ultimate issue.”  Rule 704(a) embodies the modern 
consensus of courts that any witness’s opinion, whether lay or expert, 
should be admitted at trial when helpful to the trier of fact.19  According 
to the Advisory Committee, Rule 704 abolished the common law “ultimate 
issue” rule.20  The “ultimate issue” rule prohibited any witness from giving 
an opinion regarding issues that were the exclusive province of the jury to 
decide, such as the guilt or innocence of a defendant.21  The Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 704 criticize categorical limitations on the 
ultimate-issue testimony as “unduly restrictive,” difficult to apply, and 
useful only to deprive the trier of fact of useful information.”22  As one 
scholar argues, 
The reasoning behind [Rule 704] is sound: assuming that an expert 
provides a solid foundation and explanation on an issue for which the 
factfinder needs assistance, the expert should not be precluded from 
providing a logical and helpful conclusion to his testimony. The 
factfinder is simply left hanging if the expert is not permitted to cap 
off the testimony by stating a conclusion on the ultimate issue to which 
the expert is testifying. Sometimes, a conclusion on an ultimate issue 
ties the expert’s testimony into a coherent whole, and as such it helps 
the jury to understand the issues in dispute.23 
In similar fashion, the Advisory Committee characterized the purpose 
of the “ultimate issue” rule, to prevent witnesses from “usurping the 
province of the jury,” as “empty rhetoric” that leads to “odd verbal 
circumlocutions.”24  The rationale for precluding ultimate opinion 
psychiatric testimony extends to any ultimate mental state of the defendant 
that is relevant to the legal conclusion sought to be proven.25  The Advisory 
Committee has fashioned its Rule 704 provision to reach all legal issues 
 
 19. Sean Reilly, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b): A Remedy in Need of a Cure, 
28 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 112 (2015). 
 20. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note. 
 21. Reilly, supra note 19 (citing Anne Lawson Braswell, Resurrection of the 
Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 620, 620–21 (1987)). 
 22. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note; 7 Wigmore §§ 1920, 1921; 
McCormick § 12. 
 23. Capra, supra note 5. 
 24. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note (citing 7 Wigmore § 1920, p. 17) 
(“[For example], a witness could express his estimate of the criminal responsibility of 
an accused in terms of sanity or insanity, but not in terms of ability to tell right from 
wrong or other more modern standard.”). 
 25. § 704:2. Federal practice, 22A Mo. Prac., Missouri Evidence § 704:2 (4th 
ed.) (2019) (quoting report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. 
& Admin.News 3182, 3412 to 13 (1985)). 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/10
2020] MISSOURI’S ULTIMATE ISSUE RULE 849 
for which experts provide testimony, for example, premeditation in a 
homicide case, or lack of predisposition in entrapment.26 
B. Congress’s Subsequent Alteration of Rule 704 
The public became outraged with the policy of permissibility in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence toward expert testimony following the acquittal 
of John Hinckley, Jr., for the shooting and attempted assassination of 
President Ronald Reagan, Press Secretary James Brady, and two others in 
1981.27  At trial, psychiatric experts for both the prosecution and the 
defense offered divergent opinions as to whether Hinckley could form the 
requisite specific intent.28  The jury eventually found Hinckley not guilty 
by reason of insanity.29 
In a relatively swift response to the Hinckley verdict, Congress passed 
the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, one provision of which added a 
subdivision (b) to Rule 704.30  In clear conflict with the Advisory 
Committee Note,31 Rule 704(b) “plainly revives the ultimate issue rule in 
criminal cases” by prohibiting an expert in a criminal case from testifying 
to whether the defendant did or did not have the requisite mental state to 
commit the charged crime.32  The merits of Rule 704(b) are the subject of 
contentious debate.  On one hand, the legislative intent is clearly to limit 
psychiatrists to “presenting and explaining their diagnoses,” and to prevent 
them from being asked to speak in terms of “legal or moral constructs” 
that could be construed by a jury as outcome determinative.33  On the other 
hand, some scholars criticize the addition of Rule 704(b) as “rais[ing] the 
very anomaly” discussed in the Advisory Committee Note – that an expert 
could say something about the defendant’s mental state but “simply cannot 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Dana R. Hassin, How Much Is Too Much? Rule 704(b) Opinions on Personal 
Use vs. Intent to Distribute, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 670 (2001) (citing Insanity 
Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984)). 
 28. Jonathon B. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined, 94 
YALE L.J. 1545 (1985). 
 29. Lynda C. Fentiman, Whose Right is it Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to 
Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Declarant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1109, 1169 (1986). 
 30. Capra, supra note 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–4247). 
 31. Capra, supra note 5.  This amendment was promulgated outside the rule-
making process, and so there is no advisory committee note for reference. 
 32. Capra, supra note 5. 
 33. Hassin, supra note 27 (citing FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note). 
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say the buzzword ‘intent’ or ‘incapable of understanding the wrongfulness 
of his actions.’”34  However, Rule 704(b) is highly unlikely to change.35 
C. State v. Clements 
In State v. Clements,36 decided before the Legislature enacted Section 
490.065.2(3)(b), the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, 
invoked Rule 704(b) to hold that certain expert testimony deprived a 
criminal defendant of a fair trial.37  In Clements, the State’s expert witness 
testified the defendant deliberated and therefore satisfied the deliberation 
element of first-degree murder.38  The trial court instructed the jury on the 
definition of “deliberation” and on the State’s first- and second-degree 
murder instructions.39  Because the jury had already found Clements guilty 
of the homicide, “Dr. Harte’s answer bore directly on the crucial element 
of its degree.”40  Clements claimed Dr. Harte “invad[ed] the province of 
the jury” by making the “ultimate decision” as to whether Clements 
deliberated about the killing.41 
In assessing whether the trial court properly admitted the challenged 
statement that Clements deliberated before the killing, the court concluded 
that Rule 704(b) would clearly render the statement inadmissible.42  The 
court relied on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit’s statement that “The purpose of [Rule 704(b)] is to eliminate the 
confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly 
contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the 
trier of fact.”43  The court also cited the United States Court of Appeals for 
 
 34. Capra, supra note 5; see also Reilly, supra note 19, at 116 (The Advisory 
Committee observed that the [ultimate issue]  rule was “unduly restrictive, difficult of 
application, and. . . deprive[d] the trier of fact of useful information.” Predictably, 
these same problems have haunted the courts since Rule 704(b) brought the “ultimate 
issue” rule back from the dead.”). 
 35. Reilly, supra note 19, at n.207 (“If the Rule is to change, Congress must 
change it. While the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe rules of evidence, those 
rules must be consistent with Acts of Congress. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–72 (2012).  
Therefore, because Congress has legislated on the issue of expert testimony in criminal 
trials in Rule 704(b), the Supreme Court may not change the Rules of Evidence to 
contradict this Rule.  Id. at § 2071(a).”; see also Capra, supra note 5, at n.12 (noting 
Congress’s ultimate authority over the rulemaking in federal courts)). 
 36. State v. Clements, 789 S.W.2d 101, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020.1 (1986)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 107–08. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 107–08 (quoting United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1462–63 
(11th Cir. 1986)). 
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the Eighth Circuit’s statement that “Rule 704(b) forbids ‘testimony … as 
to whether [the defendant] had the specific criminal intent’ required to 
commit the offense charged.’ … Such testimony, because it specifically 
comments on the presence or absence of an element of the crime charged, 
is too conclusory to be helpful to a jury.”44  The court would have reached 
the same result in Clements if it had applied Section 490.065.2(3)(b) 
instead of Rule 704(b) because the two rules are textually identical. 
The Clements court relied on a body of Missouri decisions consistent 
with the spirit and purpose of Rule 704(b).  The court found a consensus 
among Missouri courts that the opinion testimony of expert witnesses 
“should never be admitted unless it is clear that the jurors themselves are 
not capable, for want of experience or knowledge of the subject, to draw 
correct conclusions from the facts proved.”45  It relied on Supreme Court 
of Missouri precedent in enunciating that “[a]n expert witness may not be 
called upon for a conclusion of law.”46 
The general rule is that a medical expert will not be allowed to invade 
the province of the jury and substitute his reasoning and conclusions for 
the reasoning and conclusions of the jury upon the issue, or issues, before 
the triers of fact.  
The general rule is that a medical expert will not be allowed to invade 
the province of the jury and substitute his reasoning and conclusions 
for the reasoning and conclusions of the jury upon the issue, or issues, 
before the triers of fact. … [A] medical expert in a criminal prosecution 
[is not] allowed to state whether the [defendant] had mental capacity 
sufficient to know right from wrong, or to form a specific criminal 
intent to an extent rendering him amenable for his crimes.47 
The Clements court found that the psychiatrist was not an expert on 
the “paramount issue” of whether the defendant deliberated because 
deliberation was an ultimate issue within the capability of lay jurors.48  In 
other words, expert testimony is generally inadmissible if the jury can 
determine the issue on its own.49   
The court held that the challenged testimony deprived Clements of a 
fair trial partially because the expert made an impermissible “leap in logic” 
and inferred “what is in fact unspeakable, namely, the probable 
 
 44. Id. (quoting United States v. Gipson, 862 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
 45. Id. (quoting Sampson v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 560 S.W.2d 573, 586 (Mo. 
1978) (en banc)). 
 46. Id. (quoting Gardine v. Cottey, 230 S.W.2d 731, 745 (Mo. 1950) (en banc)). 
 47. Gardine, 230 S.W.2d at 745 (Mo. 1950) (en banc) (quoting Deiner v. 
Sutermeister, 178 S.W. 757, 764 (Mo. 1915) (emphasis added)). 
 48. Clements, 789 S.W.2d 101, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 49. See Landers v. Chrysler Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
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relationship between medical concepts and legal or moral constructs[.]”50  
This proscription is especially true with respect to the insanity defense.  In 
this context, “insanity” is a legal term with a different meaning and 
different purpose than medical insanity.51  The purpose of the insanity 
defense is to determine who among the mentally ill should be held 
criminally responsible for their conduct.52  As staff members of the 
National Legal Research Group, Inc. stated: 
An individual may be “medically insane” and yet legally responsible 
for his or her acts.  The distinction between legal and medical insanity 
is that, from a medical standpoint, one may be insane by reason of a 
mental disease or mania; from a legal standpoint, one’s mental 
condition must be such that one is unable to distinguish right from 
wrong and is unable to know the nature and consequences of actions. 
The classification of a mental disease or defect developed by 
psychiatrists for the purpose of treatment does not control a legal 
definition used for assessing criminal responsibility. A clinical 
diagnosis of mental illness or psychosis does not equate to legal 
insanity, and a person who suffers from schizophrenia and is psychotic 
can often distinguish right from wrong. Mental illness alone is not 
sufficient to relieve criminal responsibility; instead, a defendant who 
is mentally ill but fails to establish an insanity defense, may be found 
guilty but mentally ill in some states.53 
Clements provides incontrovertible evidence that Missouri courts and 
practitioners should align their interpretations and applications of Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) with federal jurisprudence on Rule 704(b).  After all, the 
Clements court imposed the federal ultimate issue rule in a criminal case 
long before the Legislature codified it.  
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Given the contentious nature of Rule 704(b), one might question why 
the Missouri General Assembly codified the rule word-for-word.  Subpart 
 
 50. Clements, 789 S.W.2d at 109, 111 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 819 
F.2d 262, 265 (11th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted)) (When … ‘ultimate issue’ 
questions are … put to the expert witness who must then say ‘yea’ or ‘nay,’ then the 
expert witness is required to make a leap in logic.  He no longer addresses himself to 
medical concepts but instead must infer or intuit what is in fact unspeakable, namely, 
the probable relationship between medical concepts and legal or moral constructs such 
as free will.  These impermissible leaps in logic made by expert witnesses confuse the 
jury.”). See also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 777 (2006). 
 51. Kristina E. Music Biro et al., Distinction Between Legal Insanity and Mental 
Illness, 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 46 (2019). 
 52. Kristina E. Music Biro et al., supra note 52. 
 53. Id. 
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A scrutinizes legislative motivations for, and judicial benefits of, 
Missouri’s copying of Rule 704(b).  Subpart B examines the three 
Missouri appellate cases that have mentioned Section 490.065.2(3)(b) but 
found it inapplicable.  Finally, Subpart C argues that those cases portend 
issues pertaining to the proper scope and application of Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) but provide limited utility in defining its proper scope and 
application. 
A. Missouri’s Codification of Section 490.065.2(3)(b) 
The original version of Section 490.065, enacted in 1989 and 
effective until August 28, 2017, provides valuable context for this inquiry: 
In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.54 
Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces 
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at 
or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and 
must be otherwise reasonably reliable. 
If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of 
opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of 
hypothetical questions, unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical 
question will make the expert’s opinion more understandable or of greater 
assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case.55 
It should come as no surprise that the Legislature copied Rule 704(b) 
in enacting Section 490.065.2(3)(b) because more than forty states mimic 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and states often “follow the [United States] 
Supreme Court’s gloss on those rules.”56  Such following is common even 
in the few states which do not mimic the Federal Rules of Evidence.57  One 
scholar argues that the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 704(b), 
function as models and “constitutional guarantors” for state courts and 
 
 54. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (1989). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
703, 709 (2016). 
 57. Dodson, supra note 56. 
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legislatures.58  Further, alignment with a federal rule that promulgated and 
approved by the Supreme Court “practically guarantees that a state rule 
will withstand constitutional scrutiny.”59  Thus, the Supreme Court 
provides “safe-harbor incentives” for state rules.60  Rule 704(b) and its 
state-law counterparts are no exception to this trend. 
B. Missouri Case Law Pertaining to Section 490.065.2(3)(b) 
Three Missouri cases have presented opportunities for application of 
Section 490.065.2(3)(b) since its adoption in 2017: the Missouri Court of 
Appeals, Western District, decided State v. Capozzoli in 2019,61  and the 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, heard State v. Murphy and 
State v. Walther in 2017 and 2019, respectively.62   
In State v. Capozzoli, a driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) case, the 
State’s drug recognition expert testified that the defendant exhibited 
several conspicuous indicia of intoxication at the time of her arrest.63  
Capozzoli claimed Section 490.065.2(3)(b) barred admission of the 
testimony.64  Capozzoli’s argument hinged on the court finding that the 
“intoxicated condition” element of DWI65 constitutes a “mental 
condition.”66  The court acknowledged that nothing in Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) defines “mental condition,” but disposed of Capozzoli’s 
objection on the ground that the testimony at issue pertained to 
Capozzoli’s physical, not mental, condition at the time of the offense.67  
This holding is consistent with the Missouri courts’ longstanding 
characterization of “intoxication as a physical condition[.]”68  
 
 58. Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 119–
24(2008). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Stein, supra note 58, at 119–21. 
 61. State v. Capozzoli, 578 S.W.3d 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). 
 62. State v. Walther, 581 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); State v. Murphy, 534 
S.W.3d 408 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
 63. Capozzoli, 578 S.W.3d at 844 (“Officer Dumsday testified about his contact 
with Ms. Capozzoli after her arrest, noting that her face was flushed, and her eyes 
were bloodshot. He also noticed an odor of alcohol ‘from her person’ and testified that 
her speech was slurred.”). 
 64. Id. at 846. 
 65. See MO. REV. STAT. § 577.010.1 (2017) (“A person commits the offense of 
driving while intoxicated if he or she operates a vehicle while in an intoxicated 
condition.”). 
 66. Capozzoli, 578 S.W.3d at 845–46. 
 67. Id. at 846. 
 68. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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In both State v. Walther69 and State v. Murphy70 the Eastern District 
found that the parties failed to preserve for review any issue under Section 
490.065.2(3)(b).  Murphy is unique in that, although having already 
disposed of the issue on the basis of appellant’s failure to preserve the issue 
for review,71 the court still applied Section 490.065.2(3)(b) to the disputed 
evidence and articulated a bright-line rule that “an expert witness’s opinion 
regarding a defendant’s state of mind is inadmissible because ‘[t]he state 
of mind of a defendant is clearly within the jury’s competence.’”72   
Murphy appealed his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and 
second-degree assault for his role in a fatal car crash.73  Murphy argued 
the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion in limine 
barring his expert witness, a pharmacist-toxicologist, from testifying that 
(1) Murphy was not criminally negligent,74 (2) Murphy was unaware of 
his mental and physical impairments at the time of the accident, and (3) 
Murphy had been involuntarily intoxicated.75  Murphy argued that, based 
on the opinion of his expert witness, “the jury could have easily concluded 
that [Murphy] was not criminally negligent.”76  Murphy insisted he 
crashed the car because he had consumed medication that was prescribed 
to him just one day before the accident.77  The trial court found that the 
barred testimony would have improperly provided an expert opinion on 
Murphy’s mental state and guilt.78  In response, Murphy’s counsel then 
stated in a narrative offer of proof that Murphy’s expert witness, after 
having reviewed the investigative reports and Murphy’s medical records, 
was qualified to opine on whether Murphy was criminally negligent and 
whether Murphy was unaware of his mental and physical impairments at 
the time of the offense.79   
 
 69. State v. Walther, 581 S.W.3d 702, n. 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). 
 70. State v. Murphy, 534 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
 71. Id. at 415 (“Defendant’s counsel did not make an offer of proof regarding 
[the] excluded opinion that Defendant was involuntarily intoxicated at the time of the 
accident, and therefore our review of its exclusion is not preserved for appeal.”).  See 
also State v. Flynn, 937 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Fleer, 
851 S.W.2d 582, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“When an objection is made to proffered 
evidence and that objection is sustained, the proponent must make an offer of proof in 
order to preserve the matter for appellate review.”). 
 72. Murphy, 534 S.W.3d at 415–16. 
 73. Id. at 410. 
 74. Criminal negligence establishes mental culpability for both first-degree 
involuntary manslaughter and second-degree assault.  See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
565.024.1(2), 565.060.1(4) (2000). 
 75. Murphy, 534 S.W.3d at 414. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 415 (“To preserve a claim relating to a motion in limine, the proponent 
must attempt to present the excluded evidence at trial and, if it remains excluded, make 
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In its opinion, the court’s first basis for upholding the exclusion of 
the testimony was that defense counsel made an insufficient narrative offer 
of proof regarding the excluded testimony and thus failed to preserve 
review of its exclusion for appeal.80  Moreover, the court found Murphy’s 
offer of proof insufficient for the remaining conclusions that Murphy was: 
(1) unaware of his mental and physical impairments; and (2) not criminally 
negligent, since defense counsel did not explain how the witness, a 
psychiatrist, was qualified to offer the legal opinion that Murphy was not 
negligent.81  The court found these arguments to constitute “conclusions 
regarding [Murphy]’s state of mind and his guilt, respectively”82 and noted 
that “[t]he state of mind of a defendant is clearly within the jury’s 
competence.”83  The court reasoned that expert witnesses “are not allowed 
to testify regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant as it usurps the 
decision-making function of the jury.”84  Although the Murphy court could 
have disposed of any issue arising under Section 490.065.2(3)(b) solely on 
the basis of failure to preserve such issue for review, its application of the 
statute comports with the “consistent[]” judicial prohibition of expert 
testimony regarding a defendant’s state of mind or guilt.85  
Most recently, in Walther, the Eastern District “decline[d] to 
comment on how, or whether [Section] 490.062.2(3)(b) would affect the 
admissibility of the testimony of the State’s psychiatric expert that the 
defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect under the Revised 
Statutes of Missouri.”86  This testimony precluded Walther’s request for 
the trial court to instruct the jury on diminished capacity.87  Walther did 
not raise an issue regarding the admitted testimony under Section 
 
a sufficient offer of proof.  An offer of proof must be sufficiently specific to inform 
the trial court what the evidence will be, the purpose and object of the evidence, and 
the facts necessary to establishing admissibility of the evidence.”) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
 80. Id. (“The preferred method for making an offer of proof is to question the 
witness outside the presence of the jury.  Although some Missouri courts have allowed 
counsel to make the offer in narrative form, it is more difficult for counsel to present 
a detailed and specific summary of a witness’s testimony without presenting 
conclusions of counsel.  Mere conclusions of counsel will not suffice.  Therefore, 
when counsel uses the narrative offer of proof he or she ‘runs a greater risk that the 
court will find the offer insufficient.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 81. Id. (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 929 S.W.2d 757, 762) (“A narrative offer 
of proof that is merely conclusory is inadequate.”). 
 82. Id. at 415–16. 
 83. Id. (quoting State v. Cochran, 365 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)). 
 84. Id. at 415–16 (quoting State v. Cochran, 365 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012)). 
 85. Id. at 416 (citing State v. Cochran, 365 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012)); State v. Clements, 789 S.W.2d 101, 110–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 86. State v. Walther, 581 S.W.3d 702, 705 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). 
 87. Id. at 706. 
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490.065.2(3)(b).88  The court declined to raise such an issue sua sponte 
because “[i]ssues not raised on appeal are considered waived.”89 
C. What Murphy, Capozzoli, and Walther Portend 
Eventually, a Missouri court will be required to confront a challenge 
to the admission or exclusion of evidence in a criminal trial under Section 
490.065.2(3)(b).  Unfortunately, the Murphy–Capozzoli–Walther trilogy 
fails to provide useful, practical guidelines on Section 490.065.2(3)(b).  
For example, the Capozzoli court found it is “unclear … what criminal 
offenses the Legislature had in mind when it included ‘mental condition’ 
in the proscription on expert testimony where [mental condition] is an 
element of the crime charged,”90 perhaps signaling uncertainty and 
discomfort with Section 490.065.2(3)(b).  Rather, the Murphy–Capozzoli–
Walther series highlights a need to look to state and federal jurisprudence, 
past and present, to enunciate fundamental, overarching guidelines on the 
scope and application of Section 490.065.2(3)(b).   
IV. DISCUSSION 
This Part discusses Section 490.065.2(3)(b) through a prospective 
lens.  Subpart A examines State ex rel. Gardner v. Wright,91  which firmly 
suggests that Missouri courts should interpret Section 490.065.2(3)(b) the 
same way that the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts 
interpret Rule 704(b) and its state-law counterparts.  Subpart B examines 
the key federal precedent, Clark v. Arizona, a 2006 case in which the 
United States Supreme Court applied an Arizona statute substantially 
similar to Rule 704(b).92  Subpart C provides scholarly support for the 
proposition that Missouri courts and practitioners should apply Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) as narrowly as possible – that is, only to expert psychiatric 
and psychological testimony. 
A. State ex rel. Gardner v. Wright 
In State ex rel. Gardner v. Wright, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
considered the application of the new standards for the admissibility of 
expert testimony in a criminal case set forth in Section 490.065.2, which 
adopts Rule 704 verbatim.93  The court stated that proper application of 
 
 88. Id. at 705 n.2. 
 89. Id. (quoting State v. Lucas, 452 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)). 
 90. State v. Capozzoli, 578 S.W.3d 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). 
 91. State ex rel. Gardner v. Wright, 562 S.W.3d 311, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). 
 92. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
 93. State ex rel. Gardner v. Wright, 562 S.W.3d 311, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). 
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Section 490.065.2 is “guided by existing and still applicable Missouri law 
and the federal jurisprudence on this matter,” including seminal federal 
cases and their progeny.94  Thus, the proper interpretation of Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) is no mystery: Missouri courts should interpret Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) the same way that the Supreme Court interprets Rule 
704(b) and its state-law counterparts like the Mott Rule.   
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding on Missouri 
courts, they are “suggestive.”95  Furthermore, it is generally accepted that 
language borrowed from an on-point Federal Rule of Evidence is “equally 
applicable” to the facts of a state criminal case.96  The objective of 
Missouri courts and practitioners should be to align their interpretations of 
Section 490.065.2(3)(b) with the longstanding general principle that “[a]n 
expert witness may not be called upon for a conclusion of law.”97   
B. Federal Precedent on State-Law Counterparts of Rule 704(b) 
In Clark v. Arizona, 98  the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Arizona’s Mott rule, which one scholar considers to be 
“essentially the same” as Rule 704(b).99  In Mott, the Supreme Court of 
Arizona held that testimony of a professional psychologist or psychiatrist 
about a defendant’s mental incapacity owing to mental disease or defect 
was admissible, and could be considered, only for its bearing on an 
insanity defense.100  Such evidence could not be considered on the element 
of mens rea.101  Clark was charged with first-degree murder.102  The key 
issue at trial was whether Clark “intentionally or knowingly” killed a 
police officer in the line of duty.103  Clark waived his right to a jury trial, 
so his case was heard by the court.104   
 
 94. Id. (citing Huffman v. State, 703 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)) 
(“Section 490.065.2 adopts the Federal Rules of Evidence word-for-word, and 
therefore federal precedent construing those rules is strong persuasive authority for 
how we should view admissibility under our statute.”). 
 95. Emerson v. Garvin Group, LLC, 399 S.W.3d 42, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) 
(quoting Boyer v. City of Potosi, 77 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 96. State v. Curry, 357 S.W.3d 259, 265 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 97. See, e.g., Gardine v. Cottey, 230 S.W.2d 731, 745 (Mo. 1950) (en banc). 
 98. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 737–741 (2006). 
 99. Stein, supra note 58, at 121. 
 100. State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051, 1054 (Ariz. 1997). 
 101. Id. (holding that defendant’s proffered evidence of battered woman syndrome 
was inadmissible as evidence of diminished capacity to form the requisite mental 
states for child abuse and first-degree murder). 
 102. Clark, 548 U.S. at 737–41. 
 103. Id. at 743. 
 104. Id. 
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At trial, Clark did not contest the shooting and death, but argued his 
undisputed paranoid schizophrenia disabled him from forming the specific 
intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge that he was doing 
so, as required by the statute.105  In relevant part, Clark sought to introduce 
evidence of mental illness to rebut the prosecution’s evidence of the 
requisite mens rea.106  A psychiatrist for the defense testified that Clark 
was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions about “aliens” 
when he killed the officer, and he concluded that Clark was incapable of 
understanding right from wrong and that he was thus insane at the time of 
the killing.107  
Citing Mott,108 the trial court ruled that Clark could not rely on the 
evidence bearing on insanity to dispute the mens rea, because the court in 
Mott “refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent.”109  
The trial court also held that “Arizona does not allow evidence of a 
defendant’s mental disorder short of insanity . . . to negate the mens rea 
element of a crime.”110  In essence, the trial court read Mott to prohibit 
“mental-disease evidence” and “capacity evidence” from consideration on 
a defendant’s mens rea.  “Mental-disease evidence” is expert testimony 
that pertains to whether a defendant suffered from a mental disease or 
defect, such as schizophrenia, at the time of the crime.111  “Capacity 
evidence” is expert testimony that bears on whether the disease or defect 
left the defendant incapable of performing or experiencing a mental 
process defined as necessary for sanity, such as appreciating the nature and 
quality of his act and knowing that it was wrong.112   
The judge noted that although Clark was indisputably afflicted with 
paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shooting, the mental illness “did 
not distort his perception of reality so severely that he did not know his 
actions were wrong.”113  Eventually, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether due process prohibited Arizona 
from excluding evidence of mental illness and incapacity due to mental 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 744. 
 107. Id. at 745.  In rebuttal, a psychiatrist for the state opined that Clark’s mental 
disorder did not preclude him from “appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct, as 
shown by his actions before and after the shooting.”  Id.  
 108. State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1234 (1997). 
 109. Clark, 548 U.S. at 745. 
 110. Id. at 744. 
 111. Id. at 760. 
 112. Id.; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(3) (“A person commits first-
degree murder if … intending or knowing that the person’s conduct will cause death 
to a law enforcement officer, the person causes the death of a law enforcement officer 
who is in the line of duty.”). 
 113. Clark, 548 U.S. at 746. 
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illness to rebut evidence of the requisite criminal intent.114  The Supreme 
Court now had an opportunity to define the proper scope and interpretation 
of a state statute imposing the ultimate issue rule in criminal cases, just 
like Rule 704(b).  
The majority, like the trial court, interpreted the Mott rule as 
prohibiting mental-disease evidence and capacity evidence on the 
defendant’s mental state.115  While all Justices agreed that the Mott rule 
“confines consideration of capacity evidence to the insanity defense,”116 
the dissenting Justices believed that mental-disease evidence should be 
allowed on the defendant’s mens rea because such evidence “[bore] on 
efforts to determine, as a factual matter, whether [Clark] knew he was 
killing a police officer.”117  The majority overrode this concern by noting 
that Clark’s objection to the trial court’s prohibition of mental-disease 
evidence on the issue of mens rea pertained to testimony about 
schizophrenics in general, not about Clark in particular.118  The majority 
found no due process violation in restricting mental-disease and capacity 
evidence to the insanity defense, reasoning that such restriction reasonably 
mitigates the controversial character of some categories of mental disease, 
the “potential of mental-disease evidence to mislead,” and the danger of 
according excessive certainty to capacity evidence.119  
The majority expressly held that Mott imposed no restriction on 
“observation evidence” on mens rea, as it did on mental-disease evidence 
and capacity evidence.120  In other words, testimony by lay or expert 
witnesses about what Clark did or said, which may support the 
professional diagnoses of disease and may be relevant to show what was 
on Clark’s mind when he fired his gun, was admissible.121  Therefore, 
while Mott exposes defendants to the risk of erroneous conviction, “it does 
so in a way that the Supreme Court approves in advance.”122  For reasons 
stated by the dissenting justices,123 Mott clashes with due process and 
exposes criminal defendants to a “serious informational risk” because 
psychiatric testimony, although far from indisputably accurate, can help 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 760. 
 116. In contrast, because Rule 704(b) encompasses defenses, Rule 704(b) 
prohibits capacity evidence on the insanity defense.  See United States v. Dixon, 185 
F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 1999) (In the face of mental-disease evidence, Rule 704(b) 
prohibits an expert “from testifying that [the mental-disease evidence] does or does 
not prevent the defendant from appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions.”). 
 117. Clark, 548 U.S. at 783 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 761 (majority opinion). 
 119. Id. at 773–74. 
 120. Id. at 760. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Stein, supra note 58, at 121. 
 123. Clark, 548 U.S. at 781–800 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the defendant raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he had a guilty 
mind.124   
Despite these concerns, and although a mental health expert is often 
able to provide useful information about a defendant’s capacity to form 
mental culpability for an offense, under Mott, such an expert can only 
“testify on the issue of insanity, identify a defendant’s mental disease, or 
give observational testimony about the defendant’s behavioral traits.”125  
Clark clearly demonstrates that Missouri courts should read Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) as prohibiting mental-disease evidence and capacity 
evidence from psychiatric and psychological experts on the ultimate issue 
of a defendant’s requisite mental state.  Because Section 490.065.2(3)(b) 
is textually identical to Rule 704(b), Missouri courts should permit mental-
disease evidence, but prohibit capacity evidence, on the insanity defense.   
C. Additional Support for a Narrow Interpretation of Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) 
Interestingly, Rule 704(b), unlike the Mott rule, is not textually 
limited to psychiatric or psychological expert testimony, although 
historical evidence indicates that Congress intended the Rule to apply only 
to psychiatric testimony on the ultimate issue in the case.126  Rather, by its 
plain language, Rule 704(b) broadly extends to all expert testimony and 
“inexplicably” fails to “reflect Congress’s narrow concern on the effect of 
expert psychiatric testimony.”127  For example, neither the House nor the 
 
 124. Stein, supra note 58, at 120–21. 
 125. Stein, supra note 58, at 120–21.  See Clark, 548 U.S. at 756–60 (majority 
opinion). 
 126. Reilly, supra note 19, at 117 n.62 (“Both the Senate and House reports on 
this issue indicated that the amendment was intended only to reach psychiatric 
testimony.  The Senate Report clearly stated that Rule 704 was amended to create 
limitations on ‘the scope of expert testimony by psychiatrists and other mental health 
experts,’ and went on to say that, ‘[u]nder this proposal, expert psychiatric 
testimony would be limited to presenting and explaining their diagnoses, such as 
whether the defendant had a severe mental disease or defect and what the 
characteristics of such a disease or defect, if any, may have been.’ S. Rep. No. 98-225, 
at 230 (1983) (emphasis added).  Similarly, the House Report read, ‘with regard to the 
ultimate issue, the psychiatrist, psychologist or other similar expert is no more 
qualified than a lay person.’  H.R. REP. No. 98-577, at 16 (1983).  The Senate report 
specified that the rationale for excluding psychiatric expert testimony on ultimate 
issues was not limited only to the insanity defense but also included other mental 
states. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230.  However, nowhere in either report does Congress 
indicate there was concern with non-psychiatric expert testimony.”). 
 127. Reilly, supra note 19, at 117 n.60 (citing United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 
1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997)) (holding that “[t]he language of Rule 704(b) is perfectly 
plain. It does not limit its reach to psychiatrists and other mental health experts. Its 
reach extends to all expert witnesses.”). 
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Senate report indicates that Congress was concerned with “non-
psychiatric” expert testimony.128  Because the rules of statutory 
construction given by Supreme Court precedent require that plain and 
unambiguous statutes be applied according to their terms,129 most federal 
courts “dutifully apply this broadly-written rule” to all expert opinion on 
a defendant’s requisite mental state.130  This interpretation, while faithful 
to Rule 704(b)’s plain meaning, is “unduly restrictive, as it limits expert 
testimony not only beyond what Congress originally intended,”131 but also 
beyond what is necessary to achieve Congress’s intended result: 
Both the Senate and House reports on this issue indicated that the 
amendment was intended only to reach psychiatric testimony.  The 
Senate Report clearly stated that Rule 704 was amended to create 
limitations on “the scope of expert testimony by psychiatrists and other 
mental health experts,” and went on to say that, “[u]nder this proposal, 
expert psychiatric testimony would be limited to presenting and 
explaining their diagnoses, such as whether the defendant had a severe 
mental disease or defect and what the characteristics of such a disease 
or defect, if any, may have been.” …  Similarly, the House Report read, 
“with regard to the ultimate issue, the psychiatrist, psychologist or 
other similar expert is no more qualified than a lay person.”132   
The more broadly judges construe Rule 704(b), the more they will 
deprive juries of relevant and helpful testimony.133  To avoid this problem, 
Missouri courts should apply Section 490.065.2(3)(b) narrowly, or in other 
words, only to psychiatric expert testimony bearing on a defendant’s 
requisite mental state.  This narrow construction of Section 
490.065.2(3)(b) would not violate state precedent. 
 
 128. Reilly, supra note 19 at 117 n.62. 
 129. Id. at 117 n.64 (citing Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)) (“If the 
meaning is unambiguous, no further steps need to be taken to apply another meaning 
to the statute.”). 
 130. Id. (“The Supreme Court holds that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be 
interpreted in the same manner as any other statute, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993), and thus the first interpretive step is to consider the plain 
meaning of the statute, Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988). If 
the meaning is unambiguous, no further steps need to be taken to apply another 
meaning to the statute. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009).”). 
 131. Reilly, supra note 19, at 118. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Anne Lawson Braswell, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal 
Rule 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 620 n.5 (1987). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although only three Missouri appellate cases even mention Section 
490.065.2(3)(b), and Section 490.065.2(3)(b) was not outcome-
determinative in any of those cases, an examination of Missouri and 
federal precedent provides clear guidance for its interpretation by Missouri 
courts and practitioners.  Missouri courts no longer need to wonder what 
the Legislature had in mind when it enacted Section 490.065.2(3)(b).134  
The bottom line is clear: Rule 704(b) prohibits an expert from testifying 
that mental-disease evidence does or does not prevent the defendant from 
appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions.135  Section 490.065.2(3)(b) 
prohibits expert mental-disease and capacity evidence, but not observation 




 134. State v. Capozzoli, 578 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). 
 135. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 758 n.30 (2006) (quoting United States v. 
Dixon, 185 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
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